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School-based management (SBM) became a predominant education management reform over twenty 
years ago, when a number of OECD countries saw it as a way of improving responsive school 
management and also give their education systems an edge in international learner comparability 
studies. These high stakes assessments encouraged many education systems to look at improving 
ways of supporting and putting pressure on schools to improve their performance. The belief was that 
if decision-making, control of budget and of the curriculum were devolved to school level, and if this 
led to parents and the local community holding the school accountable for its performance, then 
schools would become more responsive, efficient and effective. In the following decade the World 
Bank (2008) and other aid agencies promoted SBM innovations in Europe, Asia and the Americas, as 
part of a wider decentralization agenda. Africa was slow out of the blocks, with SBM only picking up 
on the continent after the start of the new millennium, although some countries, such as South Africa 
(South African Department of Education 1996a), had been making legislative changes which created 
space for SBM in the 1990s.  
Before looking at SBM and decentralization it is important to reflect on the earlier arguments for 
centralization in education systems, as the supposed benefits of centralization are likely to be lost or 
diluted by decentralization. These were, according to Pillay (1995: 17), predominantly two-fold: to 
enhance equity by reducing social disparities between communities and different parts of the country; 
and to utilise economies of scale and allow greater mobility of scarce resources to where they were 
most needed. In South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia centralization was also related to control by 
apartheid regimes, which were facing pressure from decentralizing tendencies towards education for 
democracy and liberation encapsulated in the Peoples’ Education movement (Fiske & Ladd 2004; 
Nekhwevha 2002; Prew 2013a).  
Decentralization is viewed by policy makers and donor agencies as helping to ensure wider 
representation of legitimate interests, in this case public school stakeholders, in school decision-
making. By so doing, it is argued, better decisions can be made, which are more sensitive to local needs 
and priorities (Kiragu et al 2013; Thurlow 2003). In the OECD countries the main powers which are 
devolved from the centre to school level are the payment, hiring and firing of staff; allocation and 
management of the budget; delivery of the curriculum; procurement of learning and teaching 
materials; maintenance and extension of the school infrastructure; and monitoring and evaluation of 
teacher and learner performance (World Bank 2008). Apart from broadening local-level engagement 
with making school decisions, it also provides the basis for SBM, by providing the school’s 
headteacher, and often a formal management team, with more authority and space to implement 
such site-based decisions. There is also an intention of making schools more accountable to their 
communities by exposing school planning, finances and other decisions to local oversight through 
school governance bodies.  
While donors and governments tend to profess commitment to decentralization as part of a prevailing 
international political discourse favouring decentralization, with growth of local democracy along with 
the rights of the users of government services to have a say in the management of those services, the 
process can create negative tensions. Fullan (1999) argues that there is little evidence that 
decentralization achieves what it intends to as it almost always leaves considerable residual power at 
central and regional levels, and has little or no impact on the teaching and learning process. This is 
because it tends to focus on the management and governance of the school. Further, in true 
decentralization, changes in power relations are liable to take power away from some parties, which 
will be resisted. At the other end democratization can empower local leaders and structures, which 
may see opportunities to ‘capture’ power through school governance structures and use it for political 
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positioning or for self-aggrandizement. In addition, in some countries while devolving responsibilities 
central authorities are loathe to devolve financial, administrative and technical resources to the local 
level (Pillay 1995), leading to an ‘unfunded mandate’.  
The World Bank (2008) points out that SBM has different elements and a different flavour in every 
country in which it is introduced, due to varied cultures, politics and education norms. Nevertheless, 
there is a general agreement on what constitutes SBM. It is, as the World Bank states, “the 
decentralization of authority from the central government to the school level” (2008: 2). Malen et al, 
quoted by World Bank (2008: 2) go further and argue that SBM sees the school as the primary unit of 
improvement and assumes that by redistributing decision-making to the “school level improvement 
might be stimulated and sustained”. The conditional in the last quote is critical – there is mixed 
evidence as to how well SBM does lead to improved performance of learners, or even to improved 
efficiency and responsiveness and better decision-making (Thurlow 2003). This is particularly the case 
in sub-Saharan African (SSA) education systems.   
School-Based Management in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
The need for an improvement in the management of secondary schools in SSA is particularly critical 
as SSA is lagging behind other regions in youth access to secondary schools, access to quality schooling 
and developing skills in schools which open pathways to employment (Majgaard & Mingat 2012). At 
the same time the secondary school sector is expanding rapidly in most African states, with a focus on 
universal secondary education (USE). This trend is being accompanied in most countries with a drive 
to decentralize decision-making to these secondary schools, with much focus on SBM. Nevertheless, 
as Majgaard & Mingat (2012:144) assert, “with a few exceptions, schools in most Sub-Saharan African 
countries have little autonomy”. Why is this still the case?  
The stated intention of decentralizing in SSA education systems, is not dissimilar to those we detailed 
for the OECD countries. Usually, the SSA central government devolves responsibility to principals and 
communities, often through a school governance structure. This redistribution of power is often sold 
as encouraging participation and so the democratization of the education system (Pillay 1995). This 
line is encouraged and supported financially by international donor agencies through both project 
funding and policy support. However, the motivation for such a policy at SSA government level is often 
more about saving money, than about improving performance. Lugaz and De Grauwe (2010) illustrate 
in four Francophone West African countries how the motivation behind decentralization in education 
was part of a broader process of decentralization, which was driven by a conviction by government 
and major donors that “decentralized management is more efficient and less costly than traditional 
centralized control” so reducing “the budgetary difficulties of central governments” (2010: 33).  
Basing decentralization on the need to cut costs in effect transfers responsibility for schooling costs 
(and risks) onto local communities, local government, NGOs, the private sector and the schools 
themselves (Pillay 1995). The assumption is that if the responsibility for education is devolved to a 
local level, that this will lead to the generation of new funds for schools and allow the expansion of 
education opportunity (Pillay 1995). The danger is that overall less funding is spent on education and 
that this creates opportunities for middle class communities to improve their schools while those 
serving poorer communities, with little access to new funding, are starved of resources. This is even 
the case in South Africa which has a relatively well-funded education system which is under-
performing (Nyanda 2014). As a result, schools and principals in South Africa, and particularly in 
township and rural areas, which have been historically under-funded and cannot mobilise funds easily 
from their communities, are often ambivalent about SBM (Botha 2006). This ambivalence is seen in 
other SSA countries (Kiragu et al 2013), where school-based survey respondents, prior to SBM being 
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introduced, indicated concerns about the impact of local politics, limited resources and personnel, 
and lack of commitment by stakeholders, and had concerns it might lead to conflict among the 
stakeholders, misuse and embezzlement of funds, delays in decision-making, lack of clear demarcation 
of duties, and conflicts of interest.  
These concerns are compounded by the menu of powers which are devolved and the lack of funds in 
many SSA countries to implement them. Certain authorities are rarely devolved to public schools in 
SSA, including the authority to set the curriculum the school delivers and the right to hire and 
particularly fire permanent staff (though many systems, including South Africa and Zimbabwe 
(Majgaard & Mingat 2012) allow schools to appoint their own additional teachers if they can mobilise 
the funds). These are powers central ministries of education hold onto for the public sector, although 
these powers are available to the growing number of low-cost private schools in most SSA countries.  
Control of the curriculum provides the central ministry with the confidence about what is being taught 
– and influence over the messaging within the curriculum – and also allows the central government to 
manage a register of allowable textbooks, with all the financial clout and advantage this gives 
individual officials. However, there is more teacher involvement in many countries in the development 
of the curriculum than there was in the past, (even if it is just through teacher representatives sitting 
on curriculum panels) and more flexibility within the school over implementing the curriculum (Jansen 
& Middlewood 2003).  
The control of hiring and firing of staff leaves the authorities the power to reward friends and family 
with posts. No SSA education system allows secondary schools to appoint substantive teachers free 
of all government involvement. However, a few countries in SSA allow schools to short-list, interview 
and recommend their preferred candidate for hiring by the Ministry or public service commission. 
These countries include Mauritius, South Africa, Namibia, and rural schools in Lesotho (Majgaard & 
Mingat 2012; Namibia Ministry of Education, Arts and Culture 2016; Prew 2013b; South African 
Department of Education 2016a). Selection of teaching staff by schools can be fraught with problems. 
There is a tendency of community members who sit on the school board and so are involved in the 
process to appoint ‘sons of the soil’ or political party cadres, which does not necessarily recognise skill. 
As a result, in South Africa the Department of Basic Education is trying to erode the right of SGBs to 
appoint educators into promotion posts (South African Department of Basic Education 2018).  In part 
this is a reaction to a national scandal where teaching posts have been ‘sold’ (DBE 2016b). Ghana has 
experienced a similar scandal (www.ghanaweb.com). 
Decentralization to schools implies the provision of grants to schools, and so, as de Grauwe (2013) 
neatly summarises it, the “decentralization of (both) education and corruption”. The opportunity for 
fraud is increased when funds are provided irregularly to schools and where the schools are not under 
a requirement to account for and manage the funds transparently (de Grauwe 2013; Levacic and 
Downes 2004). Unfortunately, schools in SSA are often the victims of irregular and opaque grant flows, 
which complicates planning (Kayabwe & Nabacwa 2014; Nampota & Chiwaula 2014) and maximises 
the opportunities for fraud, as it makes community monitoring of income and expenditure very 
difficult (de Grauwe 2013). Primary schools are more at risk than secondary schools as the latter 
usually have stronger staff skills (including often a commerce teacher who can help with the school 
accounts), a more empowered school governing body, and more checks and balances on the 
management of the school’s financial books. Where graft is found in secondary schools it is often more 
related to examination administration and to irregular tenders for textbooks, building work and 
provision of services (Berkman 2013; Whawo 2015).  
5 
 
The growth of SBM in secondary schools in SSA has been accompanied by a positive growth in the 
generation and use of data at school and system levels. This data means that the system is better 
informed and has allowed better tracking of teacher and learner attendance as well as creating 
realtime data at district level on absenteeism and where teachers are working and where replacement 
staff are required (McMeekin 2013). However, McMeekin asserts that verification of data is required 
to ensure that data is not falsified at various levels in the system for selfish reasons. Lack of verification 
creates conditions for schools to hide negative data and exaggerate any data which may lead to 
increased funding, such as learner enrolment.  
Generally, the secondary schools which have grabbed the opportunities which SBM – and 
decentralization more generally – have offered are those which were already the most functional. This 
is in line with the reaction to all innovations and instructions, which such schools are better able to 
indigenise to the school and own, making it work for the school (CDE 2011; Mzabalazo Advisory 
Services 2016). In contrast, struggling schools which have weak management teams and are often led 
autocratically tend to be destabilised by innovation, including the demands of SBM (Mzabalazo 
Advisory Services 2016). Ironically often the latter are the very schools which decentralization was 
aimed at assisting. Compared to primary schools, which are often buffeted by innovations, secondary 
schools tend to be more stable and are more likely to be confidently and professionally led, with 
greater depth and knowledge in their staff and governors, so are generally more resilient and able to 
absorb – or resist – change. They are more likely to see change as an opportunity rather than a threat. 
So, SBM tends to be more successfully implemented in better organised and managed schools 
compared to those which are poorly led and in secondary schools rather than primary schools.  
Across SSA, secondary schools generally, as a reaction to SBM and devolution of responsibilities, have 
become more democratic in their management. As a result, there has been a shift from more 
authoritarian modes of school management to ones with distributed power and more focus on 
leadership alongside management. This has been particularly explored in South Africa with its strong 
research community (e.g. Botha & Triegaardt 2017). This has not been conflict-free, as greater 
democratization and the integration of various stakeholder groups into the decision-making processes 
of the school can lead to tensions (Bush et al 2006). This is particularly common among factions of 
parents and between parents and teachers. Teachers often indicate frustration at the lack of parental 
and community engagement with school governance which then undermines the whole basis for SBM 
as it leads to greater inefficiencies and falling performance (Ayeni & Ibukun 2013). In addition, various 
studies have indicated that poorer parents in both middle-class schools and rural schools feel 
uncomfortable about not being able to contribute funds, as the school seeks new funding lines 
through parents, so avoid school governance and parent meetings (Bonilla Bogaert et al 2013; Tikly 
and Mabogoane 1997).  
Bonilla Bogaert et al (2013) argue that decentralization in African schooling systems often leads to 
structural and procedural bottlenecks which require effective management at all levels. This is 
because SBM is built on three assumptions: that communities will participate; that community 
members have capacity to improve the school; and that the school-district office interaction supports 
the accountability of all actors and promotes efficiency in school management. While South Africa and 
a number of other SSA countries have been successful in electing and maintaining school governance 
structures, and have relatively functional district offices, some education systems have struggled to 
establish such structures. In Nigeria the lack of skills among community members and the use of 
directives to set up school governance structures has led to an estimate that 60% are not functioning 
(Ayeni & Ibukun 2013). Motala and Pampallis (2001) predicted that this would be the result when 
considerable powers are devolved through legislation to communities with limited capacity and 
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expertise. The lack of literacy and management skills at local government level and in communities, 
particularly rural communities, is a common reason cited for the failure of school governing bodies to 
play the role assigned them under SBM. Some countries, such as South Africa, have helped alleviate 
this concern by intensive training of school governance members often alongside district officers 
(Tsotetsi et al 2008; Padayachee et al. 2014). Given that membership of the governance structures 
changes regularly through elections, training is an expensive process which needs to be repeated 
every few years (Padayachee et al. 2014). In Wa, Ghana, the school governance structures have 
formed a coalition across schools. This coalition allows them to solve common challenges, engage the 
district and regional education offices on equal terms, train members and act as a funding conduit 
(Bonilla Bogaert et al 2013).  
The Case of SBM in South Africa 
From the dawning of the post-apartheid dispensation in 1994 there was a commitment to 
decentralization, or at least deconcentration, across government. In education this was articulated 
by the South African Schools’ Act (SASA) 1996a, which provided for the gradual devolution of 
considerable powers to schools through their school governing bodies, which could apply for 
powers under Section 21 of the Act. Under this section schools could apply for all or some of the 
following five powers: 
 Maintenance and improve the school’s infrastructure; 
 Set the school’s extramural curriculum and determine the subjects to be offered; 
 Purchase textbooks, educational materials and equipment; 
 Pay for services (water, electricity) used by the school; 
 Other functions consistent with the Act.  
In the 2000s most schools were given no-fee status, which means that they couldn’t charge any 
user fees from learners. This put the onus on the state to provide adequate funds for these schools 
to operate. The policy on resourcing public schools was in part aimed at targeting resources, in a 
pro-poor manner, to mitigate the skewed impact of race-based school funding under the apartheid 
regime. This has been achieved to a large extent and most schools have adequate funds to manage 
their responsibilities, with the cash transfers being managed by the school and its SGB (Nyanda 
2014).  
 
Along with political decentralization which confers powers on the School Governing Bodies (SGB), 
the education establishment has pursued a policy of administrative decentralization, which 
devolves power to the school management team (SMT) and so leads to SBM (Thurlow 2003). 
Collectively these actions have provided ‘Section 21 schools’ with considerable autonomy. 
 
A problem arose in some schools with the SGB being conferred with Section 21 powers by the 
provincial authorities before it was ready for such responsibility. This was allowed for within the 
legislation, although it had been assumed that the schools would individually apply for specific 
powers when they felt ready to manage them. When the powers were conferred on schools without 
their agreement, schools were often worried about adopting these powers as they did not believe 
the circular giving them the powers, or did not know how to implement them, having had no 
training, or through concern that the funding would not be made available for them to manage the 
power effectively (DDSP 2003). The first concern – that the circular may not be trustworthy – 
indicates the problem of conferring SBM powers on schools which have no experience of managing 
their own space. There was also a concern in rural and peri-urban schools that their communities 
would not support them and may accuse the principal of mismanaging funds. This situation is typical 
of weak institutions (Agesa 2000; Pillay 2004) and where government in decentralizing withdraws 
from close monitoring of them – relying on the local community to do so, but not empowering the 
community with skills to do this – while also providing funds directly to the school (Serfontein & de 




Key documents including the Task Team Report on Education Management Development (South 
African Department of Education 1996b) and the Standards for Principalship (South African 
Department of Basic Education 2016a) define SBM and roles of school managers in the context of 
SASA. Both documents stress that SBM in itself does not assure transformation, and that real 
improvement will only come with competent management and transformational leadership of 
schools and with distributed leadership – sharing of responsibilities amongst school stakeholders. 
Both documents also position value-led management and curriculum/instructional leadership at 
the core of the principal’s role. 
 
A key power devolved to school level was that of selecting staff and even the school principal. The 
regulations allow that the school will then recommend three possible candidates for appointment 
with the provincial Minister making the final selection. The provincial Minister and staff rarely do 
so, and instead normally appoint the first on the School’s governing body’s (SGB) shortlist unless 
the department has been informed that there is a dispute over the post (Prew 2013b:67). The 
exponential increase in school-based corruption in South Africa has accompanied the increase in 
the number of principals appointed on the recommendations of SGBs, to a situation where about 
11% of all corruption cases reported across all sectors are related to schools (Corruption Watch 
2018; The South African 2018), which makes education the sector with the most cases reported. 
The report states that “the trend features principals, school governing body members and staff 
members conspiring and colluding to rob schools of funds and resources or to flout procurement 
and employment processes” (Corruption Watch 2018: 13).   
 
Significantly, the South African Department of Basic Education is realising that simply handing 
powers and even budget to school principals is not enough to create real SBM. Hence in October 
2018 the DBE held a workshop to ascertain what needs to be done to empower principals so they 
can manage their schools effectively. The Director for Education Management stated, “The 
Department is looking into a long-term plan of handing administrative powers to principals and to 
establish autonomous and self-managing schools. A School Principal Induction Programme for 
newly appointed principals is one of the Department’s strategies to professionalise principalship in 
addition to standards, qualifications and appointment processes to ensure that only qualified and 
competent teachers are appointed as school principals”. This has been on the cards for a decade, 
but is now receiving the support of the senior management in the DBE.  
 
Most South African schools are now largely self-managing within the terms of Section 21 of SASA. 
They do not have control of the curriculum they teach. However, these schools are a lot closer to 
having SBM than in most SSA countries.  
 
Conclusion 
While there have been some attempts to decentralize management and governance to secondary 
schools in SSA, in line with international trends, it has often been done grudgingly and with 
reservations. In most countries the process is driven by donors, with limited SSA government 
commitment and buy-in. This helps explain why even after a myriad of projects have had SBM and 
decentralization at the core of their theory of change, in much of SSA secondary schools are still lacking 
real autonomy. Both push and pull factors account for this. Governments are wary of losing control 
over important and often profitable functions like appointing school staff and setting the curriculum. 
On the other side schools struggle to get their communities to engage and take responsibility, and are 
also wary of the intentions of government when it offloads financial responsibilities onto schools. 
Against this generally gloomy situation, there are education systems which are making a serious 
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attempt at decentralizing school management and governance, and positive experiences of schools 
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